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How are we to understand ‘reasons for belief’? And how might such reasons talk 
illuminate traditional issues in epistemology? These are the two guiding questions 
around which this co-edited collection of twelve multi-authored essays Reasons for 
Belief is organised. As the editors observe, although reasons have taken centre stage 
in discussions of practical normativity over the last 35 years, it is only more recently 
that ‘philosophers interested in the problems of normative epistemology have 
appealed to reasons both to help explicate justification, warrant, and related concepts, 
and to address… other concerns in epistemology’. (p. viii) The volume is therefore 
timely: it not only reflects this epistemological turn to reasons but offers state of the 
art discussions of some central issues within and about that turn. 
 
Given the two organising themes––normativity and epistemology––the volume’s 
remit is vast. And, inevitably for a multi-authored collection, many of the chapters are 
motivated by different philosophical agenda. Nonetheless, there is considerable unity 
to the volume (more so, indeed, than the editors’ introduction or chapters themselves 
make explicit). And this unity-despite-diversity is a virtue: many essays engage with 
related subtopics in fruitful ways, while the competing starting points guard against 
too singular a take on what the significant issues are. Most importantly, the articles 
are of high quality: most are quite ambitious, with many contributing nicely to 
ongoing debates while others may guide future directions in their fields. All in all 
Reasons for Belief is well worth reading, both for those with prior stakes in debates 
about normativity and for those interested in assessing the prospects of reasons talk 
across a range of issues in epistemology. 
 
A now orthodox view (accepted by many, though not all, of the contributors) is that a 
normative reason is a fact or consideration that ‘counts in favour of’. A reason to 
believe that p, on this view, is a fact that favours believing that p. This is how the 
editors set the scene in their ‘Introduction’. They note some substantive and meta-
normative issues this leaves open, following up with useful summaries of the essays. 
The volume is then divided into two Parts, corresponding to its two guiding questions. 
I’ll first offer a brief summary of each essay. 
 
The first chapter-proper, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen’s ‘How to be a teleologist about 
epistemic reasons’, develops a very interesting, non-standard ‘value-based’ account 
according to which an epistemic reason to believe that p (understood as a 
consideration that counts in favour of holding a belief in the proposition that p, solely 
on account of the belief’s epistemic properties, such as its being evidentially 
supported (p. 17)) depends on both the evidence for, and the value of holding the 
belief, that p. Andrew Reisner, in ‘Is there reason to be theoretically rational?’, 
presents a worthy case for a modest version of the conclusion that there is: wide-scope 
consistency requirements of theoretical rationality provide epistemic reasons against 
holding inconsistent combinations of beliefs, since the probability of contradictory 
beliefs all being true is zero. 
 
The next three chapters transpose issues familiar from metaethics to the epistemic 
domain. Veli Mitova’s ‘Epistemic motivation: towards a metaethics of belief’ makes a 
programmatic case for cognitivism about epistemic judgements. In his thought-
provoking ‘Error theory and reasons for belief’, Jonas Olson defends an error theory 
about categorical epistemic reasons. Nishi Shah’s ‘Can reasons for belief be 
debunked?’, however, presents a novel argument for thinking epistemic error theory 
incoherent. 
 
Kicking off Part II,  Clayton Littlejohn’s ‘Reasons and belief’s justification’ offers an 
account of what is involved in doing (including believing) what reasons require, using 
this to undermine views according to which a belief’s being epistemically justified is 
subject either to only evidence or to knowledge norms. It is worth noting, however, 
that the account implicitly focuses on ‘objective’ reasons, whereas an appeal to non-
objective reasons (perhaps of the sort featuring in Schroeder’s essay, chapter 10) may 
help evidentialists respond to Littlejohn’s criticisms. 
 
The next five essays examine different aspects of the relation between perceptual 
experience and epistemic reasons. In ‘Perception, generality and reasons’, Hannah 
Ginsborg argues that perceptual experiences have conceptual content of a kind 
distinct from that had by beliefs, but in virtue of which they are capable of standing in 
rational relations to (and indeed rationalising, though maybe not giving reasons for) 
beliefs. Adam Leite’s ‘Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean 
dogmatism’ argues that, even granting a Moorean assumption that there are 
immediate experiential reasons for belief, responsible reasoning from these would not 
license the doxastically justified belief that we are not deceived; hence, Moorean 
dogmatism is unable to evade external world scepticism. Following on nicely, Ralph 
Wedgwood’s ‘Primitive rational belief-forming processes’ argues that it is rational to 
‘take experience at face value’ by accepting (as true) propositions involved in 
representational experiences––because part of what it is to be a rational agent is to 
have a disposition to have veridical experiences, where such a disposition presupposes 
possession of concepts and capacities for attitudes that direct us towards the truth. In 
‘What does it take to “have” a reason?’ Mark Schroeder’s answer is that we should set 
a low bar when it comes to both inferential and perceptual cases. The account, if 
defensible, has wide-ranging implications that may get us to rethink both coherentist 
and purely externalist models of justification and knowledge. In ‘Knowledge and 
reasons for belief’, Alan Millar then considers how it is that we can get so much––
knowledge, say––from so little. Focusing on knowledge via perceptual experience and 
testimony, he reverses orthodox accounts by arguing that the exercise of recognitional 
abilities often is the acquisition of knowledge and that we can thereby explain why we 
are justified in believing something in terms of our exercising such abilities. 
 
The final essay, Duncan Prichard’s ‘What is the swamping problem?’ returns full 
circle to issues of value. The supposed problem concerns how to explain why justified 
true belief (say) has greater (non-instrumental, putatively epistemic) value than mere 
true belief. Prichard argues that the difficulties emerge from an inconsistent triad of 
commonly held theses; and in the course of raising doubts about one of these––that 
true belief is the fundamental epistemic good––he urges that epistemologists may 
need to tame their love affair with (the value of) knowledge. 
 
Each essay deserves more detailed attention than is possible here. But I’ll offer some 
passing comments on three, focusing on the nature of the normativity that reasons for 
belief supposedly involve. 
 Central to Steglich-Petersen’s account of epistemic reasons is the following 
conditional ‘(T)’: ‘Necessarily, if S has epistemic reason to believe that p, then [if S 
has all-things-considered reason to form a belief about p, S ought to believe that p]’. 
(p.24) (T)’s plausibility rests on several contestable assumptions––for instance, that 
epistemic reasons cannot conflict and that they do not have weights. But more may 
also need to be said about the ‘ought’ that figures in it, to see how the account handles 
the following basic kind of case. Suppose that the fact that it is raining gives me 
epistemic reason to believe that it is raining. Let’s also assume that there is an all-
things-considered reason for me to form a belief as to whether it is raining, since it is 
important for me to decide whether to go outside. Nonetheless, a moment later you 
offer me something of great value for believing that it is not raining (and for not 
believing that it is raining). Here, arguably, it is not the case that I ought to believe 
that it is raining. In which case (T) looks questionable: it looks true that ‘I have 
epistemic reason to believe that it raining’, yet false that ‘if I have all-things-
considered reason to form a belief as to whether it is raining, I ought to believe that it 
is raining’. A common response amongst value-based theories is to treat such an 
ought as practical, rather than epistemic. However, once one introduces this 
distinction it becomes less clear what the remaining motivation for (T) is. So it would 
be interesting to see what this value-based account says about such oughts––and, 
more generally, how conflicting evidence-oriented and pragmatic reasons interact. 
 
Unlike Olson, I’m not impressed by Mackie-style queerness worries when it comes to 
motivating an error theory about categorical reasons (practical or epistemic). Nor do I 
think that the concept of a normative reason can be adequately analysed in non-
normative terms. But one of Olson’s implicit suggestions raises an important issue for 
all concerned. If we understand reasons for belief as categorical, there is a big 
question as to the relation between the following claims: (i) e is evidence for believing 
that p; (ii) e is a categorical reason for believing that p. If the fact expressed by (ii) is 
the fact expressed by (i) then, so long as evidence is not itself irreducibly normative, 
supposedly categorical reasons for belief turn out not to be normative––hence we can 
be error theorists about (the putative normativity of) such reasons. If the fact 
expressed by (ii) is not the fact expressed via (i), we stand in need of further 
explanation as to what (ii) does amount to––whereby it remains to be seen in what 
sense such reasons do categorically favour beliefs and hence whether there are 
irreducibly normative, categorical, epistemic reasons. At this juncture, one important 
issue becomes whether (the stuff constituting) evidence is irreducibly normative (see 
also Steglich-Petersen, pp. 31-2). Raising the right issues, as well as mounting a 
plausible defence of epistemic error theory, Olson presents a serious challenge which 
those wishing to resist such an error theory must address. 
 
Shah, though, returns a challenge to the error theorist. Schematically put (pp. 98-101): 
Error theorists about reasons for belief attribute beliefs to people. However, belief-
attributions are constitutively subject to a norm of correctness: ascribing a belief to 
someone involves judging (at least implicitly) that the belief is correct if its content is 
true. Correctness is normative. So, even the error theorist is committed to the 
existence of normative stuff (presumably stuff concerning reasons for belief). One 
question about such an argument is whether correctness has to be understood as 
normative in the specific sense that is the error theorist’s target. Olson, for instance, 
might reply that the correctness involved in ascribing any given belief to someone can 
either be explicated in non-normative terms or else implicates only non-categorical 
reasons to ascribe relevant beliefs (reasons the normative force of which depends on 
one’s goals or one’s desires to attribute particular beliefs, say). Such a response raises 
many further questions, of course, on which (as with the other chapters) it may have 
been nice to see a little more dialogue within the volume. 
 
Nonetheless, I hope this brief overview encourages those interested in normativity, 
epistemology and their interrelations to delve deeper into at least some of these 
essays. There is much to be learned from––and debated with––each. 
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